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CONSTRAINED CHOICE: 
MOTHERS, THE STATE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
by RONA KAUFMAN KITCHEN' 
INTRODUCTION 
Seeking to keep her children and herself safe, Jessica Lenahan leaves her 
abusive husband and acquires a protective order prohibiting him from approaching 
her or their children. Her ex-husband violates the order and murders their three 
daughters. 1 
Jill Burella, the wife of a police officer informs the department of her 
husband's violent abuse. She acquires multiple protective orders and calls for 
police assistance on many occasions. The department is well aware of the abuse 
and danger she faces. The officer husband violates the protective order, arrives at 
the family home, shoots his wife in the chest, and commits suicide. 2 
Rachel S., mother of two sets of twins ages two and three, reports her 
husband's violent abuse against herself and her children to the police. Thereafter, a 
neglect petition is filed against both mother and father, the children are removed 
from both parents, and, ultimately, parental rights of both mother and father are 
terminated. 3 
After a long history of abuse, including sexual assault, mother of two, Y elena 
R., flees with her children. In response, the court grants sole legal and physical 
custody of the children to her abusive ex-husband.4 
Rahsa P.'s abusive husband beats her in front oftheir four-year old son when 
she is 8 months pregnant. During the beating, which caused a miscarriage, the 
father injures the four-year old for trying to protect his mother. While the mother is 
hospitalized for her injuries, the father leaves the child home alone. County 
Protective Services removes the child from the home. Despite a no-contact order, 
Rasha complies with Father's request and has their son send his father drawings 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. I am thankful for the opportunity to 
present earlier versions of this article at Duquesne University School of Law's 20th Anniversary 
Celebration of the Violence Against Women Act, and the Temple Political & Civil Rights Law 
Review's Violence Against Women Act Symposium. I also wish to express my gratitude to Alexandra 
Bott for her research assistance, Bridget Praskovich for her editing suggestions, and the staff of the 
Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review for their hard work. Writing about family violence makes 
me especially appreciative of the men in my life. My father and husband would never hurt anyone they 
love. It also reminds me of my profound responsibility as the mother of sons, Joseph and Benjamin, to 
instill in them a respect for women and children and an understanding that love never means violence. 
I. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 753-54 (2005). 
2. Burella v. City ofPhiladelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2007). 
3. In rc Autumn F., No. K09CP09011835A, 2013 WL 2132091, at *I (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013). 
4. Yelena R. v. George R., 326 P.3d 989,992 (Alaska 2014). 
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and speak with him on the phone. Consequently, the state terminates the mother's 
parental rights. 5 
As these cases illustrate, the legal response system for private family violence 
is broken. Under the current regime, mothers with violent partners have great 
difficulty escaping their abusers and attaining safety for themselves and their 
children. When, like Jessica Lenahan, Jill Burella, and Rachel S., they take state-
sanctioned action by reporting the abuse their safety is not guaranteed. Abusers 
often violate protective orders and victims are left with little recourse. When 
mothers, like Yelena R. and Rasha P., take unsanctioned action, such as fleeing 
with their children or staying in an abusive relationship, they risk losing custody of 
their children to their abuser or the state. 
In part, battered mothers have difficulty attaining safety because the legal 
response to domestic violence is guided by myths about how safety can be attained. 
The foundational myth that a victim of abuse has the power, on her own, to attain 
safety appears to ground domestic violence law. The derivative myth that a victim 
can attain safety by leaving an abusive relationship is particularly prevalent. 
Consistent with these myths, the state provides support to victims who seek to exit 
abusive relationships. This support is largely unhelpful to mothers however, 
because it ignores the realities of their lives and relationships. Adherence to these 
myths has contributed to the development of a legal regime that puts all 
responsibility for attaining safety on the victim while simultaneously constraining 
her choices by forcing her to respond to abuse in specific state-sanctioned manners. 
Therefore, mothers who are victims of abuse face an inhospitable legal regime 
in their quest for safety. The resulting problem is twofold. Where mothers take 
action consistent with their own judgment, 6 but not sanctioned by the state, they 
risk punishment in the form of loss of child custody or criminal prosecution. 7 On 
the other hand, if they respond to abuse in a state-sanctioned manner, they are often 
unable to attain lasting safety. This reality is a direct result of the law's misguided 
reliance on myths and its failure to defer to maternal judgment. 
In addition to the practical problems mothers face as a result of the legal 
response to domestic violence, there are theoretical concerns as well. Domestic 
violence laws and policies constrain maternal choice8 by failing to provide mothers 
5. In rc T.B-W, No. 27544,2015 WL 1227823, at *I, 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2015). 
6. See Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: 
From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 145, 152 (2015) ("[R]cscarch shows women arc best able to 
predict their own risk .... [Ncvcrthclcss,] the state and institutions construct a 'haven' based on their 
view of the problem, thereby prioritizing their ideas of how best to save women from the violence, while 
not prioritizing women's own perception of what is 'safe' for themselves today, tomorrow, and in the 
future."). 
7. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Haltered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Haltered 
Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1996) (arguing that courts should abandon 
a strict liability test for finding mothers culpable for violence against their children and instead should 
adopt an objective test that will hold mother-abusers responsible, but will release mother-victims from 
liability). 
8. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Haltered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1229-
40 (2001) (exploring how policies and Jaws deal differently with the choices of battered women); Ruth 
Jones, Guardianship/or Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 
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with broader support to escape abusive relationships and attain safety. 9 Rather than 
being guided by maternal judgment for how best to attain safety, 10 the legal 
response to domestic violence is based on the myth that mothers can attain safety 
by simply reporting the abuse and leaving the relationship. 11 It is a myth that 
victims of domestic violence have the power, on their own, to become safe. 
Nevertheless, it remains staunchly adhered to by legal actors. The reality is that no 
matter what a mother does to keep herself and her children safe, without broader 
state support, her actions are often in vain. In addition to encouraging mothers to 
take action that is unlikely to increase their safety, reliance on these myths justifies 
punishing mothers who stay in abusive relationships. 
The purpose of this Article is to critique the state-based response to domestic 
violence for its role in constraining maternal choice. I look to statutory initiatives as 
well as judicial decisions and provide a description of the landscape for mothers 
who are the victims of domestic violence. Several questions guide this inquiry. 
What legal options are available to mothers when they seek to escape a violent 
relationship? How does the state support mothers when they use available legal 
tools to facilitate their escape? How can mothers keep their children safe from a 
violent father? What recourse is available to them when they remain threatened 
even after utilizing the existing legal machinery? How do mothers fare when they 
take unsanctioned action to attain safety? And, how does the state response to 
domestic violence support maternal decision making? 
In this Article, I demonstrate that the legal response to domestic violence fails 
mothers and argue that it should be reformed to provide support for a broader range 
of maternal decisions. Under the current legal regime, mothers are likely to face 
violence or punishment regardless of the course of action they choose. When a 
mother follows the legal rules, her safety and the safety of her children often 
remain threatened. When a mother acts consistent with her own judgment, but 
outside of state-sanctioned conduct, she faces retribution by the state. I argue that 
the solution to this problem lies in rejection of the myths that have guided the 
GEO. L.J. 605, 609 (2000) ("[W]hen a battered woman is so controlled that she has lost her 
autonomy, ... resources [such as restraining orders, shelters, and support groups] are not genuine 
options."). 
9. See Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims' 
Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, II AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & 
L. 465, 472 (2003) ("Victims of intimate partner violence usc a wide variety of strategies to stop or 
escape from the violence, ranging from attempts to reason with an abuser to fighting back, calling 
police, seeking help from a shelter, or cooperating with a criminal prosecution. Battered women's 
strategies-including their actions and wishes with respect to the criminal justice system-arc likely to 
shift over time as other factors in their life situation change."). 
10. See generally Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Holistic Pregnancy: Rejecting the Theory of the 
Adversarial Mother, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 207 (2015) (discussing State intervention in 
pregnancy and the law's failure to defer to maternal judgment and decision making). 
II. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and Changing Attitudes 
Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. I, 28 (2013) ("The real and 
perceived changes in women's economic independence and ability to obtain a divorce ... [combined 
with] the popularization of psychological theories linking intimate-partner abuse to female 
masochism ... contributed to a new era of assigning blame to victims both for the domestic violence 
they suffered and for failing to separate from their abusers."). 
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state's response to domestic violence and the development of a legal framework 
that would, instead, provide support for a wider range of maternal choice and 
conduct. 
This Article proceeds in two parts with a conclusion. In Part I, I provide a 
brief history of domestic violence and the state's efforts to combat it. In Part II, I 
describe the legal labyrinth abused mothers face, showing that regardless of their 
actions, mothers are unable to guarantee their safety and the safety of their children. 
I. HISTORY 
Domestic violence, generally, is defined in the dictionary as "the inflicting of 
physical injury by one family or household member on another." 12 More 
specifically, the Department of Justice defines domestic violence as "a pattern of 
abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain 
power and control over another intimate partner."13 Domestic violence takes many 
forms and may include physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological 
actions or threats of actions that influence another person. 14 This includes 
"behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, 
coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone." 15 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s when the battered women movement began 
to gain momentum, public officials openly declared that the federal government 
played no role in domestic violence issues, 16 describing the issue of battling 
domestic violence as a "private family matter."17 Members of Congress viewed 
federal intervention in domestic violence disputes as an interference and as 
"antifamily." 18 Indeed, society accepted these views and often saw the victim's 
behavior as a reason the abuse was warranted. 19 Due to these views, many violent 
12. Domestic Violence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.mcrriam-
wcbstcr.com/dictionary/domcstic%20violcncc (last visited Mar. 17, 20 15). 
13. Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justicc.gov/ovw/domestic-violcnce#dv 
(last updated July 23, 2014). 
14. !d. 
15. ld. 
16. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, I IS 2 MANY: TWENTY YEARS FIGHTING 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS 5 (2014), available at 
http://www.whitehousc.gov/sitcs/default/files/2014_ vawa_report.pdf; see also Reva B. Siegel, "The 
Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2171 (1996) (stating that 
during the 1960s, police officers were directed to treat domestic violence disputes as personal matters 
that did not require direct police action). As it gained momentum, the battered women's movement 
began to contest the appropriation of women's bodies, challenged previous conceptions of male 
supremacy, and promoted women's right to bodily integrity and autonomy. G. Kristian Miccio, A House 
Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women 's 
Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237,248-50 (2005). 
17. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 5. 
18. !d. 
19. See Amy M. Zclccr, Battling Domestic Violence: Replacing Mandatory Arrest Laws with a 
Trifecta of Preferential Arrest, Officer Education, and Batterer Treatment, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 541, 
544 (2014) (explaining a study conducted during the early 1970s revealed that men arrested for domestic 
violence were given lenient treatment, which was attributed to the "court's belief that the men were 
merely 'responding to marital stress' or to their wives' incendiary conduct. Women were 'agents 
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situations were acknowledged, but ignored.20 
In 1990, then-Senator Joe Biden brought the Violence Against Women Act to 
fruition. 21 He explained that there were three main goals of the bill: "to make streets 
safer for women; to make homes safer for women; and to protect women's civil 
rights. "22 As a result of recognizing the extent of violence faced by women and the 
specific impacts on interstate commerce due to that violence, Congress enacted the 
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA").23 On September 13, 1994 President 
Clinton signed VA W A into law. 24 At the time, law enforcement had a rather weak 
protocol in place for dealing with domestic violence issues. Police would often deal 
with domestic violence calls by walking the abuser around the block to let him cool 
down.25 Usually, no further state action was taken. 26 Police were not properly 
trained to handle domestic violence cases. As a result, police often doubted the 
victim, and criticized her response to her partner's actionsY 
VA W A was an important step toward enhancing the safety of domestic 
violence victims, including mothers and their children, through improved law 
enforcement responses and state-based processes. In enacting VA W A, Congress 
responded to increased awareness of violence against women.28 Awareness 
concerning the prevalence of violence against women continued to grow and in 
1991 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York noted 
in Ericson v. Syracuse University29 that gender-motivated violence was the leading 
cause of injuries to women ages fifteen to forty-four, more common than 
automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined. 3° Furthermore, the 
provocateurs' in their own thrashings." (citing Miccio, supra note 16, at 255)). 
20. !d. at 5, 5 n.3 (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 185 (2004) 
("Rape and wife beating were often compared; each was a taboo subject, rarely discussed in public, 
except as a joking matter.")); Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing The Legal Impact of Negative Social 
Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEWCRIM. L. REV. 644,658 (2010)). 
21. /d. at 10. 
22. !d. (citation omitted). 
23. Darold W. Kilmer & Mari Newman, VAWA: A Civil Rights Tool for Victims of Gender-
Motivated Violence, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 77. 
24. Lyn Rosenthal, 18th Anniversary of the Violence Against Women Act, THE WHITE HOUSE I IS 2 
MANY BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:18 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/17/18th-
anniversary-violence-against-women-act. 
25. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 32. 
26. /d. 
27. See, e.g., Charlotte Libov, Domestic Violence Focus of Training, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/l 0/27/nyregion/domcstic-violence-focus-of-training.html (discussing the 
enactment of a Connecticut law requiring domestic violence training for all police officers in response to 
the case of Tracey Thurman, who successfully sued her local police force for negligently handling her 
domestic violence complaints). 
28. See, e.g., LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42499, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
ACT: OVERVIEW, LEGISLATION, AND FEDERAL FUNDING I (2014) ("Congressional passage of YAWA 
was ultimately spurred on by decades of growing unease over the rising violent crime rate and a focus 
on women as crime victims."). 
29. 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
30. Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-
138, at 38 (1993)). 
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court explained that as many as four million women a year were the victims of 
domestic violence and three out of four women were predicted to be the victim of a 
violent crime sometime during their life. 31 
Today, VA W A is situated at the center of much of the governmental response 
to domestic violence. VA W A provides grants to law enforcement to develop and 
implement better programs to prevent and respond to domestic violence. 32 It 
encourages states to adopt pro-arrest policies to better deal with domestic 
violence. 33 Along with training officers and professionals to handle the unique 
dynamics that come along with domestic violence cases, cities now have 
investigators and prosecutors who have specialized skills in order to competently 
handle domestic and sexual abuse cases that were previously overlooked.34 
Beneficial changes within law enforcement in relation to domestic violence cases 
include the "vertical" model of prosecution, in which the same investigators and 
prosecutors handle a given case from beginning to end, so that survivors of abuse 
are not passed through multiple sets of officers and lawyers. 35 Some offices have 
created "rapid response models" whereby a "survivor's safety is immediately 
assessed and addressed, a charging decision quickly made, and the case put on an 
accelerated docket."36 Additionally, some police departments and prosecutor's 
offices have taken on domestic violence or sexual assault advocates as part of their 
teams, so that victims have a reliable source to confide in throughout the ordeal. 37 
Other states have enacted individual programs that supplement VA W A with 
the assistance of federal grants. One example is the STOP (Services, Training, 
Officers, and Prosecutors) VA W A Formula Grant Program. 38 The purpose of 
providing this grant is to support and encourage the "development and 
strengthening of effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to address 
violent crimes against women and the development and strengthening of victim 
services in cases involving violent crimes against women."39 State agencies, units 
of general local governments, Indian tribal governments, public or private nonprofit 
31. /d. 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg(b)(I), (3) (2013) (providing grants for "training law enforcement 
officers ... and prosecutors to more effectively identify and respond to violent crimes against women, 
including the crimes of sexual assault, domestic violence, [and] dating violence" and for "developing 
and implementing more effective police, court, and prosecution policies, protocols, orders, and services 
specifically devoted to preventing, identifying, and responding to violent crimes against women"). 
33. /d. §§ 3796gg(a)-(b)(l) ("The purpose of this subchapter is to encourage States, Indian tribal 
governments, State and local courts (including juvenile courts), tribal courts, and units of local 
government to treat domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking as serious violations 
of criminal law .... [G]rants [may be made available] ... [t]o implement proarrest programs and 
policies in police departments, including policies for protection order violations and enforcement of 
protection orders across State and tribal lines."). 




38. STOP Violence Against Women Act Grant, Mo. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
http://www.dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/cvsu/stopvawa.php [hereinafter STOP Violence] (last visited Apr. 
3, 2015). 
39. /d. 
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organizations (including faith-based organizations), and non-governmental or tribal 
victim services programs are all eligible to apply for funding. 40 The funds provided 
by the Office on Violence Against Women are allocated as follows: 25% for 
prosecution, 25% for law enforcement, 5% for the courts, 15% for discretionary 
matters, and 30% for victim services, at least 10% of which must be allocated for 
community-based culturally specific victim services. 41 Some of the focus areas of 
the STOP Program include training law enforcement officers, judges, other court 
personnel, and prosecutors to more effectively prevent, identify, and respond to 
violent crimes against women, including the crimes of domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault and stalking. 42 
In addition to using federal funding to improve programs that help combat 
domestic violence, states have enacted various laws to help protect those who fall 
victim to domestic violence and abuse. Twenty-one states currently have 
mandatory arrest laws.43 Mandatory arrest laws provide that an officer is required to 
arrest an alleged abuser if there is probable cause to believe domestic violence has 
been committed, despite the wishes of the victim.44 A number of states have pro-
arrest laws that favor arresting an alleged abuser, but do not require it. 45 The 
remaining states leave the decision of whether to arrest an abuser up to the 
discretion of the officer handling the domestic violence case.46 
Since VA WA's passage, awareness about domestic violence has risen among 
governmental actors. No one can doubt that the public response to domestic 
violence has improved significantly. Government initiatives are aimed at reducing 
the rate of family violence and improving law enforcement responses when it does 
occur.47 Among state actors, there now seems to be virtually universal recognition 
40. /d. 
41. Grant Programs. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justicc.gov/ovw/grant-programs#svaw (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
42. STOP Violence, supra note 38. 
43. See AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST POLICIES 
(2014) [hereinafter ABA COMM'N], available at 
http://www .american bar. org/ contcnt/darn/aba/ administrati vcldomestic _viol cnec I /Resourccs/statutorysu 
mmarycharts/2014%20Domestic%20Violcncc%20Arrest%20Policy%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf 
(providing arrest policy details for U.S. states and territories). 
44. See. e.g., CONN GEN. STAT.§ 46b-38b(a) (2014) ("Whenever a peace officer determines upon 
speedy information that a family violence crime has been committed within such officer's jurisdiction, 
such officer shall arrest the person or persons suspected of its commission and charge such person or 
persons with the appropriate crime."); Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for 
Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 7, 15, 31 (2004) (asserting that the adoption of mandatory arrest policies wrongfully deprives 
battered women the choice of deciding whether or not to have her abuser arrested and prosecuted). 
45. ABA COMM'N, supra note 43; Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: 
Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1150 (1994) (stating that 
pro-arrest laws recommend that arrests be made in certain instances of domestic violence, but reserve 
police discretion in determining whether a particular case fits within those circumstances). 
46. ABA COMM'N, supra note 43. 
47. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Vice President Biden and Attorney General Holder 
Announce Grants to Help Reduce Domestic Violence Homicides (Mar. 13, 2013), available at 
https://www.whitchouse.gov/thc-prcss-officc/2013/03/13/vice-prcsidcnt-biden-and-attorncy-gcncral-
holdcr-announcc-grants-help-re. 
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that domestic violence is intolerable.48 
Nevertheless, domestic violence remains prevalent. In the post-VA W A United 
States, more than forty-two million women are victimized by intimate partner 
violence sometime in their lives. 49 Approximately seven million women experience 
intimate partner violence in a given year. 50 In the last decade alone, almost twelve 
thousand women were murdered by their current or former male partner. 51 Federal 
Bureau of Investigation figures show that between 2001 and 2012, more American 
lives were lost to domestic violence than to terrorism, the war in Iraq, and the war 
in Afghanistan combined.52 In 2013, in Pennsylvania alone, domestic violence 
claimed the lives of 107 victims. 53 
Although government action to address domestic violence has improved, 
domestic violence persists. In addition to continuing to implement measures that 
will prevent domestic violence, it is also· important to revisit and reevaluate the 
progress that has been made. Legislative and judicial responses to domestic 
violence must be reexamined to ensure that they provide victims with consistent 
and effective relief. 
II. THE LEGAL LABYRINTH 
Despite their prevalence, when acts of domestic violence become public, 
society responds with outrage and disbelief. Historically, victims garnered more 
public sympathy than they do today. 54 As social norms evolved and women came to 
be viewed as equal participants in society, much ofthe sympathy that was once felt 
toward victims dissipated. 55 Today, the public's response to domestic violence 
includes both concern and frustration. Generally, the public calls upon victims to 
take protective action. 56 Victims are generally urged to report the abuse57 and leave 
48. See id. (citing municipalities across a number of states that will undertake initiatives to combat 
domestic violence homicides). 
49. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF THE CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THE NAT'L INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 
SUMMARY REPORT 39 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/violcnccprcvcntion/pd£1nisvs _rcport20 I 0-a.pdf (stating that women of color arc 
more likely to experience intimate partner violence than white women). 
50. !d. 
51. Alanna Vagianos, 30 Shocking Domestic Violence Statistics 7hat Remind Us It's an Epidemic, 
HUFF. POST (Oct. 23, 2014, 9:25AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/23/domcstic-violence-
statistics _ n _5959776.html. 
52. Mansur Gidfar, Don't Believe in the War on Women?, UPWORTHY, 
http://www.upworthy.com/dont-bclieve-in-the-war-on-women-would-a-body-count-change-your-mind 
(last visited Apr. 3, 20 15). 
53. PA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2013 FATALITY REPORT-NO MORE: TOGETHER WE 
CAN END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, available at http://www.pcadv.org/Lcam-
Morc/Domestic-Violence-Topics/Fatalities/. 
54. See generally Ramsey, supra note II (explaining the decrease in sympathy for victims of 
domestic violence throughout history). 
55. /d. at 28-32. 
56. See id. at 8-9 (describing the decrease in sympathy and examples of victim's requests for 
protection); Path to Safety, NAT'L DoMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org/help/path-
to-safety/ (last visited May 17, 2015) (providing a list of multiple tools that domestic violence victims 
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the relationship. 58 Outsiders are quick to judge victims who fail to take one of these 
approved courses of action. 59 The public cannot understand a woman who stays in 
an abusive relationship and "allows" her abuser to inflict injury upon her or her 
children. 60 Some even believe that women who stay deserve to be abused. 61 
The state has endorsed the view that victims should take action to become 
safe.62 State-based responses to domestic violence have mirrored the public's 
position that women should report63 and leave. 64 States have passed laws that 
encourage women to take these sanctioned courses of action. 65 In addition, states 
can use to take protective action against abusive partners). 
57. See Path to Safety, supra note 56 (stating that victims of domestic violence should report abuse 
to obtain protective orders or restraining orders, and also file criminal charges against their abuser). 
58. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and 
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 557-58 (1992) ("The immediate question 
for most people when they first hear about the problems of battered women is 'why don't they leave?' 
This question reflects a tendency to want battered women to take control, to act as agents and reject 
completely their victimization. However, many battered women cannot leave. They have no money, no 
child care, no employment; they arc financially and emotionally dependent on the men who batter them; 
they think that it is better to stay with the men because of children; or they don't want to leave, because 
they love the men and want to maintain whatever intimacy and sense of connection they can."); 
Compelling Reasons Women Stay, DOMESTIC ABUSE PROJECf, 
http://www.domesticabuseproject.com/get-educated/compelling-reasons-women-stay/ (last visited May 
17, 20 15) (stating that one of the most common questions our culture asks victims and survivors of 
domestic abuse is "why do/did you stay in an abusive relationship?" or "why doesn't she just leave?"). 
59. See Ramsey, supra note II, at 5 (stating that the criminal justice system has become less 
sympathetic toward women trapped in violent intimate relationships). 
60. See id. at 28 (explaining how many have no sympathy for women in abusive relationships in 
light of the perception that women have attained social and legal equality and, therefore, have the 
resources to leave an abusive relationship). 
61. See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the 
Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 433 (2004) ("[T]he most strategic defense 
attorneys and the most chauvinist traditionalists blame women for domestic violence and rape."). 
62. See Ramsey, supra note II, at 6-20 (detailing the government's view towards victims of 
domestic violence). 
63. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An 
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 80 I, 810-11 (1993) (affirming that all 
fifty states have made civil protection orders available for victims of domestic violence and have 
enacted laws in the area of criminal and family law to address and penalize domestic violence). 
64. See Kristen M. Driskell, identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence, 20 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 129, 130-31 (2009) (stating that fleeing to escape domestic violence may be 
the only way for victims to break free from the cycle of abuse and noting the existence of confidential, 
federally-funded domestic violence clinics). 
65. Jd. All states have protection from abuse orders available for victims of domestic violence. See, 
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 19-A, § 4007 (2014) (stating that upon finding that a defendant committed 
the alleged abusive conduct, the court may grant a protective order, directing the abuser to refrain from 
threatening, assaulting or otherwise abusing the victim and any minor children residing in the victim's 
household); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (2014) (stating that protection from abuse court orders may 
direct the abuser to refrain from abusing the victim or minor children, grant sole possession of the shared 
residence to the victim, and award sole custody of any minor children to the victim). Many states have 
also passed laws providing for the mandatory arrest of persons that police officers know or reasonably 
suspect committed acts of domestic violence. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-6-803.6 (2015) (stating 
that peace officers must arrest any person whom they have probable cause to suspect was involved in 
committing an act of domestic violence); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075 (2014) (stating that a law 
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have passed laws that punish women if they fail to leave an abusive relationship 
through state-sanctioned routes.66 Meanwhile, other areas of law, especially family 
law, place conflicting pressures on mothers who are victims of abuse. Family law 
codes and courts prefer co-parenting, an often impossible reality for women and 
children escaping a dangerously abusive fatherY Family courts punish parents, 
enforcement officer must arrest and take into custody any person he reasonably believes is committing 
or has committed domestic abuse). In addition, some jurisdictions have adopted "no-drop" policies, 
whereby the prosecution of an abuser continues even if the victim wishes to drop the charges or refuses 
to testifY. See Angela Corsillcs, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: 
Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 858, 860-62 (1994) (pointing 
out that the following jurisdictions have no-drop prosecution policies: Jefferson County, Kentucky; 
Marion County, Indiana; Duluth, Minnesota; and San Francisco, California). Victims that ultimately 
decide to divorce their abusive spouses may even file for divorce on fault-based grounds. See, e.g., LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (2014) (stating that a divorce may be granted upon proof that the offending 
spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking divorce, or a child of either party); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (2014) (stating that a divorce may be granted for physical cruelty). 
66. A mother could have her children taken away by the juvenile courts for being in an abusive 
relationship and thereby endangering her child. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 32A-4-2, 32A-4-6 (2014) 
(stating that a child may be held or taken into custody when a law enforcement officer reasonably 
believes the child was abused, including situations where a parent knowingly, intentionally or 
negligently places the child in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health); W.VA. CODE§§ 
48-27-202, 49-1-3, 49-6-3 (2014) (stating that a child may, upon petition, be placed into the custody of 
the state department when harmed or threatened by domestic violence); see also In re Michael G., 752 
N.Y.S.2d 772, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (finding that a child was neglected by his mother under New 
York law following evidence of domestic violence in the home, the mother's failure to obtain a 
protective order against the abusive father, and the mother's failure to seek refuge for herself or her 
child). A mother may also face criminal charges for neglecting her children by failing to leave an 
abusive relationship. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12C-5 (2014) (stating that a person 
commits the crime of child endangerment by knowingly causing or permitting a child to be placed in 
circumstances that endanger the child's life or health); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-4-403 (2014) (stating that 
a parent is guilty of criminal child endangerment for knowingly or with criminal negligence causing, 
permitting, or contributing to the endangerment of the child's life or health by violating a duty of care, 
protection, or support); see also Dcancse Williams-Harris, Mother Held On $250K After Boyfriend 
Charged In Beating Death of Her Toddler Son, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 26, 2015, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-mother-held-on-250k-in-beating-dcath-of-hcr-
toddler-son-20150126-story.html (mother charged with the crime of child endangerment after her 
boyfriend beat her child to death, when the mother had actual knowledge that her boyfiicnd physically 
abused her child on previous occasions, but still left her child in his care). 
67. See Ramsey, supra note II, at 19 (explaining states' usc of joint custody provisions). Many 
states have adopted laws that encourage co-parenting in custody arrangements, which prevents victims 
from being able to escape their abusive partners. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-13-101 (2014) (stating 
that an award of joint custody is favored in Arkansas and that custody shall be awarded in such a way to 
assure the frequent and continuing contact of the child with both parents, but the court will consider 
other factors, including whether one parent attempted to disrupt an existing or pending custody 
arrangement); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5328 (2014) (stating that when making custody determinations, one 
of the factors a court considers is which parent is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and 
continuing contact between the child and the other parent); see also Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic 
Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 404 (2005) 
(discussing the dangers of joint custody presumptions for victims of spousal abuse and their children); 
Beverly Webster Ferreiro, Presumption of Joint Custody: A Family Policy Dilemma, 39 FAM. 
RELATIONS 420, 420 (1990) (discussing strong preference for both parents to have continuing contact 
with the child); Sara Shoencr, Op-Ed, Two-Parent Households Can Be Lethal, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/domestic-violence-and-two-parent-
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including abused mothers, who fail to facilitate the abuser's relationship with his 
children.68 Sometimes, mothers even lose custody of their children to the abusive 
parent.69 As a result, women seeking to escape violent relationships often find 
themselves navigating an inhospitable legal labyrinth that constrains their choices 
and prevents them from attaining lasting safety. 70 
Research studies of intimate partner violence actually show that the most 
dangerous time for a victim is after she leaves her abuser. 71 Nevertheless, the state 
encourages victims to leave abusive relationships. This encouragement is aligned 
with the public view that women should leave their abusers. The New York Times 
articulated this popular sentiment in an article covering Ray Rice's very public 
attack against his girlfriend Janay Palmer: "A man strikes a woman with such force 
that she collapses, unconscious. He appears to spit on her body. Why would she 
then exchange wedding vows with him and, after a video surfaces showing the 
world the violence, stand by him?"72 
Through specific statutory provisions, the law encourages women, especially 
mothers, to leave abusive relationships. There are two distinct routes through which 
the law encourages mothers to leave their abusers. First, the law provides support to 
mothers who leave an abusive relationship through the issuance of protective 
orders, the adoption of mandatory-arrest laws, and the implementation of no-drop 
prosecution policies. 73 Second, the law provides an incentive for mothers to leave 
houscholds.html? _r=O ("[P]rioritizing two-parent families tethers victims of violence to their assailants, 
sacrifices safety in the name of parental rights and helps batterers maintain control. Sweeping rhetoric 
about the value of marriage and father involvement is not just incomplete. For victims of domestic 
violence, it's dangerous."). 
68. See Greenberg, supra note 67, at 418-27 (explaining that courts tend to misunderstand the 
importance of domestic violence when awarding joint custody). 
69. See id. at 425-26 (discussing court custody determinations that favor the abusive father over the 
battered mother); Schneider, supra note 58, at 557 (recounting the stories of mothers who lost custody of 
their children to abusive fathers because the court perceived that the mother had abandoned her 
children). 
70. See Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 467-73 (arguing that the legal response to domestic violence 
favors short-term victim safety over long-term victim safety); Johnson, supra note 6, at 154-72 (arguing 
that the legal system overemphasizes victims' short-term security over their long-term security including 
economic, housing, and health security). 
71. See Catherine F. Klein ct al., Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and 
Immigration Implications for Battered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with their Children, 39 FAM. 
L.Q. 109, 109 (2005) (noting that the period immediately following a victim's decision to leave her 
abusive partner is accompanied by a significant escalation in danger to her safety and welfare and that of 
her children); see also Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 
COLO. LAW. 19, 19 (1999) (stating that the chances of a woman being killed by her abuser increases by 
seventy-five percent if she leaves or attempts to leave the relationship; Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 
476 ("[B]attered women arc most likely to be killed while taking steps to end the relationship with the 
abuser or while seeking help from the legal system and at least [thirty percent] of all battered women 
who pursue legal action are reassaulted during the process of prosecution."). 
72. Jodi Kantor, Seeing Abuse, and Pattern Too Familiar, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 14/09/1 0/us/secing-abusc-and-a-pattcm-too-familiar.html? _r=2. 
73. For examples of state protection from abuse laws, sec ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 19-A, § 4007 
(2014); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (2014). For examples of state laws adopting mandatory arrest 
policies, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. 968.075 (2014). Various 
jurisdictions throughout the country have adopted "no-drop" prosecution policies, such as Jefferson 
386 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:2 
their abusers by threatening them with the loss of their children and freedom if they 
fail to do so.74 I will consider each of these in tum. 
A victim may seek support from the state in two manners: she may file for a 
protective order or she may call for police intervention. In response, the state may 
issue a protective order, arrest her abuser, and/or file charges against him for 
domestic violence. Where a civil protection order is issued, the victim is not 
necessarily safer. In fact, separation puts many victims at increased risk of abuse. 75 
Abusers are well aware that a protective order is, ultimately, no more than a piece 
ofpaper.76 In addition, a victim's acquisition of a protective order may prompt her 
abuser to take legal action against her. 77 Where the victim and abuser share 
children, an abuser will often file a claim for custody in order to maintain access to 
both the woman and the children despite the protective order.78 
Similarly, where the police make arrests or file charges in response to a 911 
call, the abuse victim is not necessarily protected. Often, victims are arrested 
instead of, or along with, their abusers. 79 A victim may be arrested for disorderly 
conduct when she argues with an officer. 80 Mandatory-arrest policies, which were 
intended to improve law enforcement's response to domestic violence, have 
increased the likelihood that a victim will be arrested when the police respond to a 
County, Kentucky; Marion County, Indiana; Duluth, Minnesota; and San Francisco, California. See 
Corsillcs, supra note 65, at 860-62; see also Robert E. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, Evaluation of Efforts 
to Implement No-Drop Policies: Two Central Values in Conflict, Final Report, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. I, 3 
(200 I), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles I /nij!grants/187772.pdf (stating that many victims' 
advocates arc pleased by the law's changing response to domestic violence such as through the adoption 
of presumptive and mandatory arrest laws, and the adoption of no-drop prosecution policies). 
74. For examples of state laws that will remove children from their mothers when there is domestic 
violence in the household, sec N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 32A-4-2, 32A-4-6 (2014); W.VA. CODE§§ 48-27-
202,49-1-3,49-6-3 (2014); In rc Michael G., 752 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). For examples of 
state laws that charge mothers criminally for failing to remove their children from domestic violence in 
the home, sec 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5!12C-5 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-403 (2014); 
Williams-Harris, supra note 66. 
75. "The incidence and severity of domestic violence increase at the time of separation, and women 
are at an even higher risk of being murdered following separation than they are while sharing their 
households with violent men." Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and 
Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases, 38 FAM. L.Q. 529, 541-42 (2004) 
(citations omitted); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal/mages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. I, 71-93 (1991) (discussing the danger to women at separation). 
76. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 553-54 (discussing a husband kidnapping and killing his three 
daughters after his wife acquired a protective order); Burel/a, 501 F.3d at 136 (discussing a husband 
shooting his wife after she acquired a protective order). 
77. Margo Lindauer, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Why Multi-Court-Involved Battered 
Mothers Just Can't Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 797,799 (2012). 
78. !d.; see Greenberg, supra note 67, at 411-12 (explaining that battcrcrs often use their custody 
rights to continue to abuse their former partner); PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE 
FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 115 (2011) (discussing the story of battered mother of five, Margaret, 
who after finally leaving her abusive husband had to defend against his campaign for custody). 
79. See Daniel G. Saunders, The Tendency to Arrest Victims of Domestic Violence: A Preliminary 
Analysis of Officer Characteristics, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 147, 149 {1995) (reporting the 
results of a qualitative empirical analysis of police officer responses to domestic violence calls). 
80. Id. at 147. 
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call for help. 81 Mothers face other risks when they call for police intervention in 
domestic violence.82 Specifically, the consequences of calling 911 may include loss 
of child custody, fmancial support, housing, health care, childcare, transportation, 
community, social support, and the emotional benefits of the relationship with the 
abusive partner.83 
Even when the police arrest the abuser alone and file charges against him, a 
victim's rights and safety are not necessarily protected. Usually, abusers are only 
charged with a misdemeanor and are unlikely to get more than a minimal 
sentence.84 Additionally, no-drop prosecution policies can be problematic for 
victims who do not want to cooperate with the prosecution. 85 There are many self-
protective reasons why a victim would not want to cooperate with the prosecution 
of her abuser86 including: (I) psychological trauma, (2) self-motivated objectives, 
and (3) external pressure or coercion. 87 As a result, victims will often recant their 
testimony, refuse to testify, or fail to appear in court. 88 In these instances, victims 
may face arrest, imprisonment, or contempt proceedings. 89 
Many advocates for domestic violence victims have criticized these policies 
for "punishing or 'revictimizing' the victim for the actions of the abuser by forcing 
the victim into a process over which she has no control. "90 Moreover, such 
experiences with the criminal justice system may discourage victims from calling 
for help at al1. 91 Additionally, there is evidence that prosecution of abusers puts 
81. /d. at 148 (stating that in Minnesota County, victims comprised thirteen percent of the arrests in 
the first year after adoption of the mandatory-arrest policy and in Wisconsin the rate of referring women 
to abuser programs increased twelve-fold after the State adopted a mandatory-arrest policy). 
82. See Epstein ct al., supra note 9, at 480 (explaining battered women often fear contact with the 
state because they fear losing custody of their children); Shima Baradaran-Robison, Tipping the Balance 
in Favor of Justice: Due Process and the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments in Child Removal from 
Battered Mothers, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 233-34 (2003) (discussing reasons why mothers may fear 
state intervention in cases of domestic violence). 
83. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 476-85. 
84. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 34-35. 
85. Njcri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. 
REV. 149, 178-80 (2009); but see generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, I 09 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (arguing in favor of a 
prosecutorial model for domestic violence cases that would balance state accountability and victim 
autonomy). 
86. See id. at 165 (explaining that external pressures on a victim can be her desire to have an intact 
family to raise her children, financial hardship, or fear of retaliation by her abuser); see also Buel, supra 
note 71, at 19-26 (discussing reasons why victims of domestic abuse find it difficult to leave their 
abusers). 
87. See Rutledge, supra note 85, at 149, 164 (stating that the most common reasons a domestic 
violence victim recants include psychological issues, coercion from battercrs, financial concerns, 
concern for children, and various other issues). 
88. Id. at 150 (stating that noncooperation of domestic violence victims by recanting or failing to 
appear at trial has become an epidemic in domestic violence cases). 
89. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 17 (stating that in certain jurisdictions, prosecutors will subpoena 
reluctant domestic violence victims to testify and arrest or request imprisonment of victims who refuse 
to appear). 
90. Hanna, supra note 85, at 1865. 
91. See generally Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 837 (2012) (arguing that the state-based response to domestic violence 
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victims at increased long-term risk of harm: 
Because the victim and perpetrator have been involved in a 
relationship, their contact may well continue beyond the 
perpetrator's incarceration. Indeed, domestic violence offenders 
typically receive shorter sentences than do defendants prosecuted for 
violence against a stranger, increasing even further the risk that a 
barterer will sustain a connection to the victim during his 
imprisonment and attempt to resume the relationship upon his 
release. Even if the relationship does not resume, the violence is 
likely to worsen, as the natural course of violent partnerships is often 
one of escalation, both in tenns of the severity and frequency of 
abuse. Finally, the possibility of long-tenn, repeat abuse in domestic 
violence cases is heightened by the fact that many barterers blame 
the victim for their incarceration and seek retribution by committing 
further violence.92 
[Vol. 24:2 
Therefore, though the law encourages mothers to attain safety by reporting 
abuse and leaving abusive relationships, these state-sanctioned courses of action 
often prove unable to protect mothers from abuse and may lead to further 
victimization of the mother by the state. By leaving the relationship and acquiring a 
civil protective order victims are not always able to attain safety. 93 Abusers, 
prompted by victim action, may become more violent against their victims or 
misuse the legal process to gain access to their victims and their children despite 
the issuance of a protective order.94 Moreover, prosecution policies may coerce 
mothers to participate in the prosecution of their abusers or result in the arrest or 
prosecution of the mothers themselves.95 Finally, using state support to escape a 
violent relationship can lead to a host of devastating consequences for the victim, 
including the possible loss of her children.96 Thus, state support to leave abusive 
relationships not only fails to guarantee victim safety, it may lead to potential re-
victimization of the victim by the state. 
In addition to encouraging victims to leave abusive relationships through 
issuance of civil protection orders, mandatory arrest laws, and no-drop prosecution 
policies, the law also encourages mothers to leave by threatening their freedom and 
violates victims' First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances by, 
ultimately, discouraging victims from reporting domestic abuse). 
92. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 467-68. 
93. "The risk of abuse increases after separation, making attention to the safety issues imperative: 
The risk of domestic violence directed both towards the child and the battered parent is frequently 
greater after separation than during cohabitation; this elevated risk often continues after legal 
intervention." Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and Custody: Importing the American Law 
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution into Oregon Law, 35 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 643, 
665 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mahoney, supra note 75, at 71-93 
(discussing cases of post-separation violence). 
94. Lindauer, supra note 77, at 799; Greenberg, supra note 67, at 411-12. 
95. Saunders, supra note 79, at 147-49. 
96. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 476-85. 
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maternal rights.97 Punitive child welfare laws threaten to remove children from their 
mother's care where the mother remains with her abuser. 98 Mothers are often 
charged for "failure to protect" their children for staying in abusive relationships.99 
Many states will bring child neglect and abuse proceedings against a mother who 
fails to leave or report an abusive relationship. 100 As a result, mothers risk losing 
their children for failing to stop the abuse in their homes, even when the "sole 
charge is violence against the mother. " 101 
Legal theorists have criticized the state for holding mothers accountable for 
protecting their children from private family violence. 102 In her article, Motherhood 
and Crime, professor and feminist legal theorist Dorothy E. Roberts critiques the 
law's prosecution of women for failing to protect their children from another's 
abuse. 103 The prosecution, conviction, and life imprisonment of a mother for first 
degree murder of her two-year old son where her boyfriend had beaten the toddler 
to death while the mother was at work, is one example of the law's harsh 
punishment of a mother for staying in an abusive relationship. 104 Roberts argues 
97. Women who fail to remove their children from domestic violence can have their parental rights 
terminated for neglecting their children. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-2; 32A-4-6 (2014); W.VA. 
CODE§§ 48-27-202,49-1-3, 49-6-3 (2014); In re Michael G., 752 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
In addition, mothers who fail to remove their children from domestic violence in the home may be 
criminally charged for neglecting their children. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12C-5 (2014); WYO. 
STAT. ANN.§ 6-4-403 (2014); see also Williams-Harris, supra note 66. 
98. See Goodmark, supra note 44, at 22 (stating that in many jurisdictions social workers may 
institute child abuse proceedings against the mother for failing to get a protection from abuse order); 
Lindauer, supra note 77, at 805 (stating that many states bring charges against domestic violence 
victims, usually mothers, for failing to protect her children from domestic abuse); see generally Suzanne 
A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557 (discussing the theoretical, public 
policy, and empirical critique of Nicholson v. Williams and theorizing the proper role of privacy in 
regulating the family). 
99. G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating 
the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89,91 (1999). 
100. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 22. 
101. Miccio, supra note 99, at 92 (emphasis added); see Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 
844 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that evidence that the mother is a victim of domestic violence and that the 
child was exposed to that violence, without more, is insufficient to find that the child is neglected under 
New York law and therefore insufficient to justify the forcible removal of the child from the mother). 
102. Professor Elizabeth Schneider articulates the sentiment well: "Responsibility for children docs 
heighten the need for safety, but we do not want to place that responsibility exclusively on the mother. It 
is difficult to determine the contours of maternal responsibility in a culture that blames mothers for all 
problems relating to children and absolves fathers of all responsibility." Schneider, supra note 58, at 
553. 
103. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 96 (1993) ("[C]riminal 
law is more likely to impose an affirmative duty on mothers than other classes of people."). 
104. Jd. at 109-10 (citing Tennessee v. Maupin, No. 272, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 818, at *I 
(Oct. 7, 1991)); see In rc T.B.-W, No. 27544.,2015 WL 1227823, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2015) 
(deciding that a mother's parental rights were properly terminated after she permitted son to have 
telephone and mail contact with his imprisoned father who had violently abused mother and son prior to 
his imprisonment); Lindley v. State, No. 08-08-00149-CR, 2010 WL 1076138, at *I (Tex. Crim. App. 
March 24, 2010) (affirming a forty-five year prison sentence to a mother following her son's murder by 
her abusive boyfriend, finding that the mother did not adequately protect her son from the injuries that 
resulted in his death by failing to immediately contact the authorities and seck medical attention after her 
son suffered a particularly vicious beating); see also Evan Stark, A Failure to Protect: Unravelling "The 
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that punishment of mothers when another harms their children is consistent with 
the social view that mothers, alone, are responsible for protecting their children. 105 
Professor Kristian Miccio further claims that holding mothers solely responsible for 
the safety of their children is conceptually related to the refusal to hold the state 
accountable for private family violence: 
While political discourse locates intimate violence within the sphere 
of state accountability, such conceptions remain outside the lexicon 
of legal discourse-particularly as the discourse pertains to battered 
mothers, their children and conceptions of a maternal duty to protect. 
State and federal courts protect a social contract where the state is 
not accountable for contributing to woman battering within the 
family. Because intra-familial violence is viewed as 'private,' the 
state is shielded from accountability. Under this conception of state 
accountability, there is no need to examine how state nonfeasance 
constructs and perpetuates the harm to battered mothers and to 
witnessing children. 106 
Thus, the state's punishment of mothers who fail to protect their children has 
important theoretical ties to the state's refusal to take any responsibility for private 
family violence. 107 The view that mothers, not the state, are responsible for 
preventing violence against children is prevalent not only under this punitive 
regime, wherein the state threatens to remove a mother's children from her custody 
or prosecute her for failure to protect, but also in cases where mothers have brought 
constitutional claims against the state for failing to help them protect their children 
from an abusive father. 108 The Supreme Court arguably sanctioned the view that 
mothers, not the state, are responsible for the protection of children in DeShaney v. 
Battered Mother's Dilemma", 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 29-31 (2000) (proposing a narrative framework 
for cases where a battered mother is alleged to have caused or contributed to her child's abuse or neglect 
and discussing the case of Hedda Nussbaum who was condemned for failing to protect Lisa Steinberg 
from being killed by her adoptive father despite the fact that Hedda, herself, had never abused the child 
and, at the time of her arraignment for murder, she "was hospitalized with 'nine broken ribs, a broken 
jaw, a broken nose and numerous bruises'"); Schneider, supra note 58, at 553 (discussing how Hedda 
Nussbaum was treated by the feminist community). 
105. Roberts, supra note 103, at 110-11. 
106. Miccio, supra note 99, at 91 (citations omitted). 
107. In Castle Rock, the Supreme Court refused to hold that law enforcement has any duty to protect 
individuals from private family violence. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760 ("We do not believe that 
these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory. A well-
established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes."). 
Some theorists also discuss the failure to put responsibility to stop battering on the battercr himself: 
"Many commentators have noted the troubling result of the focus on why the woman docs not leave. 
Asking this question places responsibility on the woman, and puts her conduct under scrutiny, rather 
than placing the responsibility on the battering man. Instead of asking 'why doesn't the woman leave,' 
we should ask 'why do men batter,' or perhaps, more significantly, 'why docs society tolerate men who 
batter?'" Schneider, supra note 58, at 558. 
I 08. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768 (holding that mother's procedural due process rights were not 
violated where police failed to respond to father's taking of children in violation of mandatory-arrest 
protective order). 
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Winnebago Cnty. Dep 't of Soc. Servs. 109 and Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. 
Gonzales, 110 wherein it held that victims of private family violence have not 
suffered a deprivation of their procedural or substantive due process rights where 
the state failed to protect them. 111 These ho !dings were extended by the Third 
Circuit, in Bure/la v. City of Philadelphia, 112 to private family violence perpetrated 
by an officer of the state. 1 13 A discussion of these cases is illustrative. 
On May 21, 1999, Jessica Gonzales, nee Lenahan, divorced her abusive 
husband Simon. 114 The court issued a restraining order against Simon in 
conjunction with the couple's divorce decree. 115 On June 4, 1999, the terms of the 
restraining order were modified and it was made permanent. 116 The restraining 
order allowed Simon limited visitation with the couple's three daughters, Rebecca 
(ten years old), Katherine (nine years old), and Leslie (seven years old). 117 
Specifically, Simon had the right to spend time with the girls "on alternate 
weekends, for two weeks during the summer, and 'upon reasonable notice,' for a 
midweek dinner visit 'arranged by the parties. "' 118 
On Tuesday, June 22, 1999, Simon took Rebecca, Katherine, and Leslie when 
they were playing outside of their home. 119 In taking the girls, Simon violated the 
restraining order issued against him. 120 Upon discovering that the girls were 
missing, Jessica called the Castle Rock Police Department. 121 The department 
dispatched two officers to her location. 122 Upon their arrival, Jessica showed the 
officers the restraining order. 123 She requested that the officers enforce the 
restraining order and that they return her children to her immediately. 124 The 
officers responded that they could do nothing about the restraining order and 
suggested that she wait until 10:00 p.m. and call the police if the children did not 
return home by then. 125 
At 8:30p.m., Jessica spoke to Simon on his cell. 126 He told her that he took the 
girls to an amusement park in Denver. 127 Jessica called the police department 
following her conversation with Simon and requested that the police department 
'"have someone check for' her husband or his vehicle at the amusement park and 
109. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
110. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
Ill. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768-69; Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
I I 2. 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007). 
113. !d. at 149-50. 
114. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751. 
115. !d. at 751-52. 
116. /d. at 752. 
117. !d. 
118. !d. 
119. !d. at 753. 
120. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 752 (stating the visitation rights of the father). 





126. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753. 
127. /d. 
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'put out an [all points bulletin]' for her husband .... "128 The officer refused 
Jessica's request and, again, told her to wait until! 0:00 p.m. 129 
At 10:10 p.m., Jessica reported to the police department that her daughters 
were still missing. 130 She was then told to wait until midnight. 131 At midnight, 
Jessica called the police department and told them her daughters were still 
missing. 132 Jessica went to her ex-husband's apartment but found no one there. 133 At 
12:10 a.m., Jessica called the police. 134 She was told to wait for the police to 
arrive. 135 No police officer ever came. 136 At 12:50 a.m., Jessica arrived at the police 
department and filed an incident report. 137 The officer at the station made no effort 
to find her daughters. 138 
At 3:20a.m., Simon went to the Castle Rock Police Department and opened 
fire on the station with a semiautomatic handgun he purchased earlier that 
evening. 139 The police returned fire, killing Simon. 140 In the cab of his truck, the 
lifeless bodies of Jessica's three daughters were found. 141 Forensic investigators 
determined that the girls were murdered by their father earlier that evening. 142 
Jessica filed suit in federal district court against the Town of Castle Rock and 
several police officers for violation of her substantive and procedural due process 
rights. 143 The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that 
Jessica failed to state either a substantive or procedural due process claim. 144 Jessica 
appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 145 There, the district 
court's dismissal with regard to Jessica's substantive due process claim was 
affirmed, but the dismissal of her procedural due process claim was reversed. 146 In 
affirming that Jessica had failed to state a claim that her substantive due process 
rights had been violated, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's 1989 
DeShaney decision. 147 









137. !d. at 753-54. 




142. !d. A factual dispute remains as to whether the girls were murdered by their father earlier that 
evening, or as a result of the police fire. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S., Case 12.626, Inter-Am. 
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80111, 'If 2, 33, 181-95 (2011), available at 
http://wcb.law.columbia.edu/sites/dcfault/filcs/micrositcs/human-rights-
institutc/filcs/gonzales%20dccision.pd( 




147. Gonzales v. City ofCastlc Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1262 (lOth Cir. 2002). 
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In DeShaney, the Supreme Court considered whether the state violates an 
individual's due process rights when it fails to protect that individual from private 
violence. 148 Specifically, the Court considered whether the state's failure to protect 
Joshua DeShaney from his violent father, Randy DeShaney, was actionable. 149 
Joshua was only four years old when Randy's abuse left him severely brain 
damaged and significantly paralyzed. 150 Joshua's injuries occurred after Randy's 
violence had been reported and after more than a year of intervention by the 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 151 By the time Joshua was four 
years old, the State had accumulated significant knowledge of his situation. 152 In 
the year preceding his final beating, Joshua had been treated in hospital emergency 
rooms multiple times, his home had been visited by Social Services numerous 
times, and the police had been called to his home to intervene in domestic violence 
on several occasions. 153 Attorneys for Joshua unsuccessfully argued to the courts 
that the history of state knowledge and interaction in Joshua's life had created a 
special relationship between him and the state that entitled him to protection from 
his father's private violence. 154 
Due to the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney, a person's ability to bring 
a substantive due process claim for private violence is significantly restricted. By 
fmding that "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by 
private actors," DeShaney established that individuals have no legal recourse when 
the state fails to protect them from family violence. 155 Therefore, DeShaney's 
holding that "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence 
simply does not constitute violation of the Due Process Clause," led to the 
dismissal of Jessica's substantive due process claim in Castle Rock. 156 
The implications of the DeShaney decision for victims of family violence are 
significant. Legal scholars have criticized this holding from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective. 157 Theoretically, many have found cause with the state's 
distinction between public and private violence and the premise that the state's role 
148. DcShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dcp't of Soc. Scrvs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989). 
149. /d. 
150. LYNNE CURRY, THE DESHANEYCASE: CHILD ABUSE, FAMILY RIGHTS, AND THE DILEMMA OF 




154. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. 
155. /d. at 195. 
156. /d. at 197. 
157. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of 
DeShancy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078, 1079 (arguing that with the increased dependence on administrative 
agencies, judicial review is more important and necessary than ever before); Phillip M. Kannan, But 
Who Will Protect Poor Joshua DeShaney, A Four-year-old Child with No Positive Due Process Rights?, 
39 U. MEM. L. REV. 543, 544 (2009) (arguing that the Court's opinion is legally invalid because it relics 
on "unsupported factual, legal, and psychological assumptions"); Lauren Oren, The State's Failure to 
Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: DcShancy in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 665 (1990) 
(arguing that the Court was incorrect to analyze DeShaney outside of the context of family violence and 
child protection). 
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is limited to protecting citizens from state-created danger. 158 This premise assumes 
that citizens are independent, autonomous, individuals capable of protecting 
themselves against private danger; that is, danger posed by other citizens. 159 This 
assumption has been attacked by feminist legal theorists for being inherently 
androcentric, and for failing to appreciate that private actors often victimize women 
and the state's refusal to protect them from private aggression contributes to their 
oppression and subordination. 160 Nevertheless, the distinction between public and 
private violence remains determinative and the Supreme Court affrrmed this view 
in DeShaney by refusing to hold the state responsible for protecting citizens from 
private violence. 161 
It was against this backdrop that Jessica filed her suit against the Castle Rock 
Police Department. Jessica's claim argued that her procedural due process rights 
were violated when the Castle Rock Police Department failed to enforce her 
protective order. 162 On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its decision, 
ultimately holding that any property right Jessica might have had in her protective 
order did not give rise to a legal entitlement for which she was entitled to due 
process. 163 Essentially, the Court held that the police did not violate any duty owed 
to Jessica or her daughters when it exercised its discretion to not enforce her 
protective order. 164 Therefore, following Castle Rock, where the state refuses to 
protect a mother and her children from their violent husband/father, even when the 
mother has a court-issued, mandatory-arrest protective order and has called the 
police for enforcement, there is no constitutional due process violation. 
Approximately two years after the Supreme Court's Castle Rock decision, the 
Third Circuit issued its decision in Burella. 165 There, Jill Burella filed suit against 
the City of Philadelphia for violation of her due process and equal protection rights 
when the City failed to enforce her restraining orders and protect her from her 
abusive husband. 166 In 1999, Jill's husband George Burella, a ten-year veteran of 
the Philadelphia police department, shot her in the chest and committed suicide. 167 
Despite her serious injuries, Jill survived the shooting. 168 The shooting followed 
years of severe domestic violence in response to which Jill made reports to the 
158. See Laura Rae Dove, A Constitutional Right to Police Protection and Classical Liberal Theory: 
Compliment, Not Catiflict, 4 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL'Y 37, 40 (2013) ("[A]ll citizens have a 
constitutional right to police protection from criminal acts by other private citizens."). 
159. Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused Woman and a 
Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 65,66-67 (2008) ("The prevailing belief is that individuals arc 
independent, autonomous beings, and therefore, free to leave, to exit, any situation at any time .... 
Abused women find it difficult to leave their abusers for many ... reasons .... "). 
160. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. I, 42 (1992). 
161. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 755, n.l3. 
162. /d. at 754. 
163. See id. at 766 ("Even ifwe were to think otherwise concerning the creation of an entitlement by 
Colorado, it is by no means clear that an individual entitlement to enforcement of a restraining order 
could constitute a 'property' interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause."). 
164. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760,766. 
165. Burella, 501 F.3d 134. 
166. /d. at 136. 
167. /d. at 138. 
168. /d. at 138. 
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Philadelphia Police Department and acquired orders ofprotection. 169 
During one incident, George "phoned his wife and threatened to shoot their 
son Nicholas if she did not immediately return to the house."170 After she called 
911, Jill rushed home. 171 Upon her arrival, George, who was armed with a gun, 
threatened to shoot her. 172 When police arrived George initially refused to 
surrender, but he did so once the officers agreed to charge him with a domestic 
incident disturbance instead of a more serious offense. 173 George's abuse continued 
despite Jill's repeated pleas for official intervention. 174 
In 2000, Jill filed suit against three named police officers, the City of 
Philadelphia, and the city psychiatrist who treated George Burella for violation of 
her due process and equal protection rights. 175 The District Court held that 
DeShaney foreclosed Jill's substantive due process claim. 176 However, it also held 
that Jill had a procedural due process right to police protection based on 
Pennsylvania's protection from abuse law and the protection from abuse orders that 
were issued by the Pennsylvania courts. 177 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the 
District Court's denial of Jill's substantive due process claim. 178 With regard to 
Jill's procedural due process claim, however, it reversed, due in large part to the 
then-recently decided Castle Rock case. 179 Finally, the Third Circuit rejected Jill's 
state-created danger claim because, as a matter of law, the Court found that she 
failed to "show that the officers affirmatively exercised their authority in a way that 
rendered her more vulnerable to her husband's abuse." 180 Therefore, even where the 
perpetrator of private family violence is an officer of the state and his position with 
the state appears to gamer him additional favor with law enforcement officers, the 
state's failure to protect his wife and children from his violent acts does not violate 
their due process or equal protection rights. 
The cases of Jessica Lenahan and Jill Burella illustrate an especially troubling 
aspect of domestic violence law. 181 States adopt mandatory arrest and no-drop 
169. /d. at 136-39. 
170. /d.at137. 
171. Burella, 501 F.3dat 137. 
172. /d. 
173. /d. 
174. /d. at 136-39. 
175. /d.at 138. 
176. /d. at 140. 
177. Burella, 501 F.3d at 140. 
178. /d. 
179. /d. at 146. 
180. /d. at 147. 
181. The Supreme Court's holding in Castle Rock, that a mother and her children have no procedural 
due process right to protection from the police where they have a mandatory-arrest protective order, has 
been widely criticized. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, If Not Now, When? Individual and Collective 
Responsibility for Male Intimate Violence, 15 WASH. LEE J. Clv. Rrs. & Soc. JUST. 405, 406 (2009) 
(critiquing the "systemic denial of collective responsibility" reflected in the Supreme Court's Castle 
Rock decision and the Third Circuit Burella decision); Zanita E. Fenton, State Enabled Violence: The 
Story of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES (Elizabeth M. Schneider 
& Stephanie M. Wildman ed., 2011) ("[P]rotcctive orders, administratively designed to ensure quick 
investigation and response, arc [now] meaningless."); Ethan Kate, A "Supremer" Court?: How an 
396 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:2 
prosecution policies to encourage and support women who report abuse and leave 
their abusers. 182 These policies communicate to victims that the state is invested in 
their safety and concerned about domestic violence. 183 However, failure to arrest an 
abuser, even in a mandatory-arrest jurisdiction where it is clear that a protective 
order was violated, is not a legally cognizable harm. 184 As the Court of Appeals 
explained in Castle Rock, such a result, "render[s] domestic abuse restraining 
orders utterly valueless."185 
Moreover, these cases demonstrate that the state does not take responsibility 
for preventing or effectively responding to private family violence. 186 Rather, the 
abused mother, alone, is responsible for ensuring her safety and the safety of her 
children. Moreover, they can only do so through state-sanctioned courses of 
conduct. Under the circumstances, it should not be surprising that many mothers 
stay in abusive relationships rather than risk the consequences of leaving. 
The realities of abusive relationships and custody determinations often lead 
mothers to stay in abusive relationships, despite express social and legal support for 
leaving. Mothers report that, among other reasons, they stay in abusive 
relationships because they fear losing custody of their children and they believe 
they are better able to protect their children from the abuser if the family remains 
intact. 187 As the above cases demonstrate, leaving an abusive relationship is no 
guarantee of safety. It therefore seems reasonable that some mothers will stay with 
their abusers so that they can better protect their children. Staying in an abusive 
Unfavorable Ruling in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Should Impact United States 
Domestic Violence Jurisprudence, 28 WISC. INT'L L. J. 430,430 (2010) (arguing that U.S. courts should 
follow a model similar to that used in evaluating cruel and unusual punishment with regards to domestic 
violence prevention); Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold: Pursuing Failure-To-Protect Claims Under 
State Constitutions Via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1294 (2010) (arguing that 
state constitutions may better support government accountability in failure-to-protect suits); Dove, supra 
note 158, at 40-41 (criticizing the Supreme Court's holdings in DeShaney and Castle Rock as 
contradictory and resulting from a logical flaw in the Court's reasoning). 
182. Jane Campbell Moriarty, "While Dangers Gather": The Bush Preemption Doctrine. Battered 
Women. Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N. Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE I, 18-19 (2005) 
(noting that over the last few decades many states have adopted mandatory arrest and no-drop policies, 
demonstrating law enforcements' willingness to intervene and prosecute cases of domestic violence). 
183. See Tamara L. Kuennen, "No-Drop" Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial 
Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 69 (2007) 
("Without making an independent finding based on the objective evidence, a court docs not meet the 
public policy dictates of the Act that victims of domestic violence must be assured the maximum 
protection from abuse the law can provide; that the official response to domestic violence, including that 
of the courts, shall communicate the attitude that domestic violence behavior will not be excused or 
tolerated; and that it is the responsibility of the courts to protect victims of domestic violence by 
ordering those remedies and sanctions that are available to assure the safety of the victims and the 
public." (emphasis added)). 
184. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768-69. 
185. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1109. 
186. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States & Collective Entity 
Responsibility for Gender-Based Violence, 21 J. GENDER, Soc. POL'Y & L. (2012) (exploring the 
implications of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights decision in Lenahan in the context of 
a broader project considering how theories of collective entity responsibility for gender-based violence 
could be integrated into the U.S. tort and criminal justice law). 
187. Buel, supra note 71, at 20. 
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relationship, however, may result in a mother's loss of custody188 or her 
incarceration. 189 Mothers may also remain in abusive relationship out of fear that 
family courts will award custody of the children to the abusive partner. Despite 
language in family codes to the contrary, family courts often trivialize the 
significance of abuse in custody determinations. 190 Moreover, "friendly parenting 
statutes," which favor the parent who will facilitate a relationship between the 
children and the non-custodial parent, often weigh against awarding custody to 
victims. 191 Often the victim will appear to be uncooperative for attempting to deny 
the abuser access to the children. 192 
Mothers are further discouraged from leaving abusive relationships by state 
kidnapping statutes. lf a mother flees with her children in contravention of a 
custody order, she may face severe criminal penalties. 193 Violations of state 
kidnapping statutes are usually felonies that can mandate imprisonment of over one 
year. 194 ln addition, mothers who refuse to allow visitation to an abuser or who run 
away with their children may face civil penalties such as adverse custody decisions, 
including the possible loss of all custody. 195 Some states allow mothers to use a 
"necessity" defense. However, this defense is risky and only available in limited 
circumstances. 196 When women flee the country to escape an abusive home, they 
risk being charged under the Hague Convention. 197 
188. See T.B-W, No. 27544, 2015 WL 1227823, at *1-2 (deciding that a mother's parental rights 
were properly terminated after she acquiesced to incarcerated abusive father's request to have son send 
him drawings and talk to him on the phone). 
189. See Lindley, No. 08-08-11249-CR, 2010 WL 1076138, at *1-3 (affirming a forty-five year 
prison sentence of a mother following her son's murder by her abuser, finding that mother did not 
adequately protect her son from the injuries that resulted in his death by failing to immediately contact 
the authorities and seek medical attention, even though mother was not in the home at the time the child 
sustained injuries); see Alex Campbell, These Mothers Were Sentenced to at Least 10 Years for Failing 
to Protect Their Children From a Violent Partner, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:51 PM), 
http://www. buzzfccd.com/ alcxcampbell/thcsc-mothers-were-sentenced -to-at -1 east -I 0-years-for-
failin#.hfe95zg6P (listing and describing the cases of 28 battered mothers in II states who have been 
imprisoned since 2004 for failing to protect their children from their partner's abuse). 
190. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 11-12 (stating that mothers frequently find that domestic violence 
committed against them and their children was considered unimportant or irrelevant in permanent 
custody disputes); Greenberg, supra note 67, at 418-419 (discussing how courts minimize or ignore 
domestic violence in making custody determinations). 
191. See id. at 28 (stating that courts can find that a battered mother's unwillingness to foster 
continuing contact is more relevant to the custody determination than the father's history ofviolencc). 
192. See Klein et al., supra note 71, at 132 (stating that battered women who intentionally flee from 
their abusers to protect themselves and their children from further harm are vulnerable to a finding of 
non-cooperativeness in custody proceedings); Goodmark, supra note 44, at 28 (stating that courts can 
find that a battered mother's unwillingness to foster continued contact between her children and her 
abuser is more relevant to the custody determination than the history of violence). 
193. Klein ct al., supra note 71, at II 0-11. 
194. /d. at 125. 
195. /d. at 131-32. 
196. /d. at 122. 
197. See Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment & Appeals Project ct al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4-5, Abbot v. Abbot, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (No. 08-645), 2009 WL 
4271310 (arguing that many mothers charged under the Convention were fleeing an abusive 
relationship); see also Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 
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Despite the risks, there are many cases of mothers who flee with their 
children. This phenomenon was explained in the amicus brief filed by domestic 
violence advocates in a Supreme Court case interpreting the convention: 
While courts and observers often assume abduction is unnecessary 
because safety can and should be achieved through the legal process, 
the realities of domestic violence suggest there are no legal panaceas 
for abuse. The painful reality is that often the only way to ensure the 
safety of oneself and one's children is to get completely away- and 
in most cases women seek to do so by returning home. 198 
An Alaskan case, decided in 2014, illustrates the potential custodial 
consequences for a mother who flees an abusive relationship with her children 
stateside. In Yelena R. v. George R.,199 the court removed children from their 
mother and placed them with their abusive father to punish the mother for fleeing 
with the children. 200 The case concerned a husband and wife with a significant 
history of domestic violence. 201 Despite divorcing, the two continued their 
relationship off-and-on until 2011.202 Their first child was born during the marriage 
and the wife gave birth to their second child after the divorce, in 2006.203 The 
relationship remained plagued by violence and the husband was arrested for 
abusing the wife. 204 When the two were living in Alaska in 2011, the wife obtained 
a protective order against her husband after he sexually assaulted her. 205 After the 
judge denied the wife's application for a long-term protective order and dissolved 
the temporary one, she fled with the children to Massachusetts without the 
husband's consent.206 The court granted sole legal and physical custody to the 
father. 207 
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index _ en.php?act=convcntions.tcxt&cid=24 (providing the text of the international 
convention on child abduction); Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International 
Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 49, 72-79 (2008) (broadly discussing the ramifications of parental kidnapping and raising the 
domestic violence defense). 
198. Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment & Appeals Project et al., as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 12, Abbot v. Abbot, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (20 I 0). 
199. 326 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2014). 
200. Yelena R., 326 P.3d at 999; see generally Hanke v. Hanke, 615 A.2d 1205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1992) (reversing and reprimanding trial court judge's order which granted overnight visitation with the 
parties' four-year-old daughter where father had sexually abused his stepchild in the past; after daughter 
reported being sexually molested by father, mother refused to allow father visitation; and the trial court 
judge was found to have ordered the overnight visitation to "punish" the mother for refusing to abide by 
the visitation order). 




205. /d. at 994. 
206. /d. at 995. 
207. Yelena R., 326 P.3d at 995. 
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State punishment of mothers who flee abusive relationships has been 
considered by legal theorists. Professor Leigh Goodrnark explains that a mother 
may face punishment regardless of whether she flees with or without her 
children.208 If she flees with her children, "without the consent of the other 
parent ... [she] may face serious criminal penalties under state parental kidnapping 
statutes ... [or] restrictive state civil statutes on child custody as well as related 
case law that encourage adverse custody decisions to penalize parents who deprive 
the other parent of access to or contact with their children. "209 If a mother flees 
without her children, she may similarly face retribution by the state. Goodmark 
explains that "[t]he mother who flees without her child could be disadvantaged by 
that decision in the custody context as well; the court could find that the mother 
abandoned the child and use that abandonment to justify a grant of custody to the 
abuser."210 
CONCLUSION 
Mothers who are the victims of domestic violence face unique challenges in 
their quest for safety. The legal response to domestic violence requires that mothers 
respond to abuse in specific state-sanctioned manners. However, when mothers 
respond accordingly, such as by reporting abuse and leaving the abusive 
relationship, their safety and the safety of their children is not guaranteed. 
Moreover, by responding in state-sanctioned manners, mothers risk a host of 
negative consequences including increased threat to their immediate and long-term 
safety, the loss of their children, undesired financial, health, and social 
consequences, and criminal prosecution. On the other hand, when mothers respond 
to abuse in unsanctioned manners, such as by staying in abusive relationships, they 
face similarly hostile consequences including continued abuse, the loss of their 
children, and criminal prosecution. Thus, regardless of how mothers respond to 
domestic violence, they risk being harmed by their abuser and the state. As a result 
battered mothers' choices are significantly constrained. 
Though the legal response to domestic violence has improved dramatically 
over the past few decades, reforms are still needed. The state should sanction a 
broader range of maternal responses to domestic violence and accept greater 
responsibility for preventing and responding to private family violence. In addition 
to increasing victim safety, implementation of these reforms would increase respect 
for maternal autonomy and demonstrate the state's true commitment to protecting 
women and children from domestic violence. 
208. Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered Woman Fleeing an 
Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1004-05 (2007). 
209. /d. at I 004. 
210. !d. at 1005; Schneider, supra note 58, at 557. 

